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Figure 1. Triangle network
I. MAIN RESULT
a) Model and definitions: We consider the network in
Fig. 1 where a source S has a message W to send to a
destinationD, such that it remains secret from an eavesdropper
Eve. The eavesdropper arbitrarily selects one of the three
channels to wiretap.
All three channels are erasure channels with erasure proba-
bilities δk and δkE , denoting the erasure probabilities toward
the network node (U or D) and toward Eve (in case she
is present on the given channel). All three channels are
independent (e.g. operate in different frequency bands) and
D can receive simultaneously over both S −D and U −D.
The channel inputs are length L vectors of Fq symbols,
which we call packets. To simplify notation, throughout the
paper we express entropy and rate in terms of packets. We
denote by Xk,i the inputs of channel k in the ith transmission,
while Yk,i, Zk,i are the corresponding output at the network
node and Eve respectively.
After each transmission, U and D causally send a public ac-
knowledgment revealing the state of each channel, i.e. whether
or not an erasure occurred (⊥ is the symbol of erasure). This
feedback, after the ith transmission, is Fi and it is assumed to
be publicly available to all network nodes as well as to Eve.
Formally, we have that:
Pr {Y1,i, Y2,i, Y3,i, Z1,i, Z2,i, Z3,i|X1,i, X2,i, X3,i}
=
3∏
k=1
Pr {Yk,i|Xk,i}Pr {Zk,i|Xk,i}
Pr {Yk,i|Xk,i} =
{
1− δk, Yk,i = Xk,i
δk, Yk,i =⊥,
, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Pr {Zk,i|Xk,i} =
{
1− δkE , Zk,i = Xk,i
δkE , Zk,i =⊥,
, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
We assume that S and U can generate private randomness ΘS ,
ΘU of unlimited rate, independently of each other and from
any other randomness in the system.
MessageW consists of N packets. A secure communication
scheme has parameters (N, ǫ, n) and satisfies the following
reliability and security conditions:
Definition 1. An (N, ǫ, n)–scheme has three sets of encoding
functions fk,i, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} as well as a decoding map φ. The
channel inputs are computed as
Xk,i = fk,i(W,ΘS , F
i−1), k ∈ {1, 2}
X3,i = f3,i(Y
i−1
2 , F
i−1,ΘU ).
D can decode the message with high probability:
Pr {φ(Y n1 , Y
n
2 ) 6=W} < ǫ. Furthermore, W remains
secret from each eavesdropper:
I(W ;Znk ) < ǫ, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Definition 2. A rate R ∈ R is securely achievable if for any
ǫ > 0 there exists a (N, ǫ, n)–scheme for which R− ǫ < 1
n
N.
In this paper, we characterize the secret message capacity of
the triangle network, i.e. the largest securely achievable rate.
Theorem 1. The secret message capacity of the triangle
network is the solution of the following linear program (LP1).
All parameters are nonnegative: mi, ki, c, ci, ri, R ≥ 0.
maxR
s.t.: R ≤ (1− δ1)m1 + (1− δ3)m3 (1)
m1(1− δ1)
1− δ1E
1− δ1δ1E
≤ (k1 + c1)δ1E(1− δ1) + r3 + c3(1− δ3)
(2)
m2(1− δ2)
1− δ2E
1− δ2δ2E
≤ k2δ2E(1− δ2) + k1(1− δ1) (3)
m3(1− δ3)
1− δ3E
1− δ3δ3E
≤ (k1 + c1)(1− δ1) + r3δ3E
1− δ3
1− δ3δ3E
+ (k3 + c3)δ3E(1− δ3) (4)
k2(1− δ2) ≥ c+ r3 (5)
c ≥ c1(1− δ1δ1E) + c3(1− δ3) (6)
c ≥ c3(1− δ3δ3E) + c1(1− δ1) (7)
(1− δ3)m3 ≤ (1− δ2)m2 + c1(1− δ1) (8)
k1 +m1 + c1 ≤ 1 (9)
k2 +m2 ≤ 1 (10)
k3 +m3 + c3 +
r3
1− δ3
≤ 1 (11)
The role of constraints (1)-(11) are explained in the next
section. The matching outer bound and the detailed technical
derivations are provided in [1].
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Figure 2. Comparison of secret message rates with/without exploiting
erasures and with/without feedback. In all cases δiE = δi + 0.2.
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Figure 3. Secret message rates with/without randomness at U . δ1 = δ2E =
0.8, δ1E = 0.5, δ3 = δ3E = 0.3 .
Solving the LP in Theorem 1 allows to evaluate 1) the
benefit of exploiting erasures 2) the benefit of exploiting
feedback 3) how much private randomness at the relay U can
help. Fig. 2 compares four schemes: secret message capacity
refers to our scheme in Theorem 1; we plot secret message
capacity without feedback to show the benefits of exploiting
erasures for secrecy yet without using feedback [2], [3];
and finally FEC+SNC refers to applying a link-by-link error
correction coding (FEC) and then using the secure network
coding scheme [4], [5].
It is clear that private randomness at the intermediate node
can only help, but it is not obvious how significant the benefit
is. Depending on the erasure probabilities, the benefit varies
a lot. In some cases, there is no use of it at all (e.g. lossless
channels), in other cases it can go up to more than 40 % gain
in capacity. Fig. 3 gives a numerical example for illustration.
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
In this section we summarize the former results that we
build on when designing our scheme for the triangle network.
A. Principle of key generation
It was shown that the erasure channel can be utilized for
generating a shared key between the sender and the receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary [2], [6]–[8]. We
use the following result:
Theorem 2. Consider an erasure channel with state-feedback
and with parameters δ, δE . If the source sends n i.i.d. uniform
random packets, then secret key of rate
δE(1− δ)
can be generated, while if the source sends i.i.d. uniform
random packets using ARQ through n transmissions, then a
secret key of rate
(1− δ)
δE(1 − δ)
1− δδE
can be generated. In both cases the resulting key K is
uniformly distributed and is produced as linear combinations
of packets that the destination receives. Further, for any ǫ > 0
I(K;Zn) < ǫ (12)
is satisfied if n is large enough.
Proof: Theorem 2 is a reformulation of Corollary 2 from
[7] and Lemma 1 from [8].
In other words, if a source sends nk all different key
generation packets it can generate a key of size k′ such
that limn→∞
1
n
k′ = kδE(1 − δ). While if it sends nk
packets using ARQ a key of size k′ can be generated and
limn→∞
1
n
k′ = k δE(1−δ)1−δδE . Having these asymptotic results in
mind, in our description of the scheme we will assume that
sending nk random key generation packets result nkδE(1−δ)
key packets, while in case of ARQ nk(1− δ) key generation
packets result a key of size nk
δE(1−δ)
1−δδE
after nk transmissions.
B. Principle of encryption
Once a key is set up between the source and the destination,
a message sending phase follows. Using the key, the message
packets are first encrypted.
Theorem 3. Consider an erasure channel with state-feedback
and with parameters δ, δE . Assume the source and the desti-
nation have access to a uniform random key K of rate κ such
that
I(K;E|W ) < ǫ,
whereW denotes the message to be sent and E denotes all the
random variables the eavesdropper observes before starting
transmissions. Then a messageW of rate min{1−δ, κ 1−δδE1−δE }
can be transmitted such that for any ǫ > 0 and a large enough
n
I(W ;Zn, E) < ǫ
holds and the destination can decode W with probability at
least 1−ǫ. Further, this rate is achievable by a strategy where
the source sends encrypted message packets W ′ using ARQ,
such that
W ′ =W ⊕KG,
where G is the generator matrix of an MDS code.
Proof: Theorem 3 is a reformulation of Theorem 2 from
[9].
Using the above theorem, a message sending phase of length
nm needs a rate m(1 − δ) 1−δE1−δδE rate key and delivers a
message of size m′ such that limn→∞
1
n
m′ = m(1 − δ).
To ease the description of our scheme we will assume
that a message sending phase of nm transmissions requires
nm(1−δ) 1−δE1−δδE key packets and delivers securely nm(1−δ)
encrypted message packets.
C. Secrecy over a point-to-point erasure channel
The secrecy capacity of a point-to-point erasure channel
with state-feedback was characterized in [9]. A two-phase
approach was introduced. In the first phase secret keys shared
between the sender and the receiver are generated. These
keys are used for encryption in the second phase, where the
encrypted message is sent to the receiver. The second phase
itself implements a capacity achieving strategy, namely ARQ,
for reliable transmission of the encrypted packets. We refer
to these phases as key generation and message sending phase
respectively. It was shown that it is possible to securely send a
message at rate R if a secret key of rate R 1−δE1−δδE is available.
A key generation rate δE(1− δ) was shown to be achievable.
In the key generation phase independently generated uniform
random packets are transmitted. Given these two components,
the key generation rate and the key requirement of the second
phase, a straightforward calculation gives that the secrecy
capacity of the erasure channel with state-feedback is
CS = δE(1 − δ)
1− δδE
1− δδ2E
. (13)
We can rewrite this result in the form of a linear program,
which will be helpful in the sequel. Let k+m ≤ 1 such that nk
is the length of the key generation phase (expressed in number
of transmissions) and nm is the length of the message sending
phase of the scheme. Then the secrecy capacity is the value
of the following linear program (LP2):
maxR such that:
R ≤ (1 − δ)m (14)
m(1− δ)
1− δE
1− δδE
≤ kδE(1− δ) (15)
1 ≥ m+ k. (16)
Here, (14) expresses that the message rate cannot be higher
than the message rate we can achieve in the second phase.
Constraint (15) ensures the security of the message. The LHS
of (15) is the secret key rate we need to secure a message
of rate (1 − δ)m, while the RHS expresses the rate of secret
key we can create with a length nk key generation phase. The
last inequality ensures that the two phases use no more than n
transmissions. In this case the solution of the linear program is
trivial, and it might seem to be an unnecessarily complicated
way of description, but at the same time it captures more
explicitly the components the scheme is built of than the pure
formula (13).
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Figure 4. Two parallel channels
D. Secrecy over two parallel channels
Consider the setting displayed in Figure4 where there are
two parallel independent erasure channels with erasure param-
eters δ1, δ1E , δ2, δ2E . We assume that there is one eavesdrop-
per who might select any one of the channels to eavesdrop on.
Equivalently we can consider two eavesdroppers, on on each
channel, who do not cooperate. The secrecy capacity of this
setting was characterized in [8]. The following linear program
(LP3) characterizes the secrecy capacity:
maxR such that: (17)
R ≤ (1− δ1)m1 + (1− δ2)m2 (18)
m1
(1− δ1E)(1 − δ1)
1− δ1δ1E
≤ k2(1 − δ2) + k1δ1E(1− δ1) (19)
m2
(1− δ2E)(1 − δ2)
1− δ2δ2E
≤ k1(1 − δ1) + k2δ2E(1− δ2) (20)
1 ≥ m1 + k1 (21)
1 ≥ m2 + k2. (22)
This linear program follows the structure of LP2. In (19)-(20)
besides the key generation terms as seen for the point-to-point
channel, terms k2(1 − δ2) and k1(1 − δ1) also appear. These
terms capture the fact that key generation packets received
through the second (first) channel can be used as secret keys
on the other channel. Indeed, these packets remain secret from
the eavesdropper who eavesdrops only the other channel.
It should be noted that the solution of this linear program is
not trivial any more. Given (13), it is clear that if we knew that
the eavesdropper eavesdrops on the first channel the secrecy
capacity would be
(1 − δ2) + δ1E(1− δ1)
1− δ1δ1E
1− δ1δ21E
,
whereas if we knew that she selects the second channel it
would be
(1 − δ1) + δ2E(1− δ2)
1− δ2δ2E
1− δ2δ22E
.
One might expect that if her selection is not known we can
possibly achieve
min
{
(1− δ2) + δ1E(1 − δ1)
1− δ1δ1E
1− δ1δ21E
, (1− δ1)
+ δ2E(1− δ2)
1− δ2δ2E
1− δ2δ22E
}
. (23)
The formula (23) gives a trivial upper bound, however – as
was shown in [8] – it is not achievable in general. In some
cases the solution of LP3 is strictly smaller than (23).
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Figure 5. V-network
E. Secrecy in the V-network
In [8] the role of common randomness in secrecy capacity
was investigated in the setting depicted in Figure 5. The two
sources S1 and S2 are connected to a common destination D
through independent erasure channels out of which any one
is eavesdropped. S1 and S2 can generate unlimited amount
of private randomness, but they have access to only a rate
limited common random source Ψ. The rate of common
randomness plays a crucial role in key generation and hence
in the achievable secret message rate, since it limits the use
of key generation packets sent through the other channel. For
the optimal use of the common randomness new methods for
key generation were introduced. The secrecy capacity is again
characterized by a linear program (LP4):
maxR such that:
R ≤ (1− δ1)m1 + (1 − δ2)m2 (24)
H(Ψ) ≥ c+ r1 + r2 (25)
m1
(1− δ1E)(1− δ1)
1− δ1δ1E
≤ r2 + r1
δ1E(1− δ1)
1− δ1δ1E
+ c2(1 − δ2)
+ (c1 + k1)δ1E(1− δ1) (26)
m2
(1− δ2E)(1− δ2)
1− δ2δ2E
≤ r1 + r2
δ2E(1− δ2)
1− δ2δ2E
+ c1(1 − δ1)
+ (c2 + k2)δ2E(1− δ2) (27)
c ≥ (1− δ1δ1E)c1 + (1− δ2)c2 (28)
c ≥ (1− δ2δ2E)c2 + (1− δ1)c1 (29)
1 ≥ k1 +m1 + c1 +
r1
1− δ1
(30)
1 ≥ k2 +m2 + c2 +
r2
1− δ2
(31)
A brief summary of the different key generation techniques is
as follows. The common randomness Ψ is divided into three
independent parts: c, r1, r2. S1 sends nr1 independent random
packets using ARQ. These packets contribute to the key of S1
with rate r1
δ1E(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ1E
. These packets are known by S2, but not
the eavesdropper on the second channel, so they also contribute
to the key of S2 with rate r1. source S2 uses the nr2 packets
from the common randomness is the same way.
From the remaining part c of the common randomness S1
sends nc1 packets while S2 sends nc2 packets. These packets
are not necessarily independent, but they are always innovative
for D and the eavesdropper (taken together). Constraints (28)-
(29) ensure this property of these packets. These packets act
like the key generation packets in the two parallel channel’s
case enabling a key rate c1δ1E(1 − δ1) + c2(1 − δ2) for S1
and c2δ2E(1− δ2) + c1(1 − δ1) for S2.
The third kind of key generation packets are generated from
private randomness. S1 sends nk1 of those and S2 sends nk2.
These packets contribute to only to the key of the given source
as seen in the case of a point-to-point erasure channel.
III. TRIANGLE NETWORK
In this paper we consider the setting in Figure 1.
There are three nodes in this network: a source S, a
destination D and an intermediate node U . All the three
channels are independent erasure channels with parameters
δi, δiE . We assume that state-feedback from each channel is
publicly available. We consider the case where there is one
eavesdropper Eve in the network, who arbitrarily selects one
of the three channels to eavesdrop on. Or equivalently we can
think of three noncolluding eavesdroppers, one on each link.
Our scheme builds on the techniques developed for the
network in Section II-E with sources accessing limited rate
common randomness. S and U can be considered as the two
sources, however, there are two key differences:
• There is no common random source that S and U shares,
what they have in common has to be transmitted by S
through the S − U channel. New randomness, which is
independent from the message arrives to U during the key
generation phase that takes place on the S − U channel.
So the rate of common randomness is limited by the
length of key generation on the S−U channel. Despite of
the source common randomness, the same key generation
techniques are applicable.
• U does not have direct access to the messageW , so even
if it had a perfect channel (δ3 = 0, δ3E = 1) it might
not be able to utilize all transmissions for the message
sending phase.
Beside the known techniques for key generation we also
utilize new algorithms to process packets at the intermediate
node. We give intuition in the following subsections.
A. Recombination of encrypted packets
The key generation packets received through the direct S−
D channel can be used on the S−U channel as keys. Notice,
that we do not require U to be able to decode the message
packets that it receives in the message sending phase that takes
place on the S − U channel. Although the key generation
packets received by D through the S − D channel do not
form a shared key between S and U , they can be used as keys
for encryption the S − U channel.
The message packets that U receives are already encrypted,
thus U can utilize the random components in these packets
against the eavesdropper on the U −D channel. Still, D has
to be able to decrypt the packets it receives, so U first needs to
remove those packets from the linear combinations that only S
and U knows. These are keys generated on the S−U channel.
After that, U needs to produce linear combinations such that
the remaining random components are sufficient to secure the
resulting message packets. The resulting packets can be sent
without using additional keys. After all it is the key generation
packets that D receives through the S−D channel that secure
these packets, hence U can secure as many message packets
using this technique as if U had direct access to both the key
packets and the message packets. We give details and formal
description about how to compute these linear combinations
later.
B. Keys used as message packets
In this section we make the observation that certain key
packets can be treated as if they were encrypted message pack-
ets. One should notice that using a one-time-pad encryption
the interpretation of packets as keys or as encrypted packets is
arbitrary. Consider the following example. Let K be a secret
key and let K+W be the encrypted message. We can equally
say that let K ′ = K + W be the shared secret and then
K = K ′ +W is interpreted as the encrypted message.
The possibility of different interpretation of packets leads
to a nontrivial observation: the number of different message
packets that U can send in the message sending phase on the
U −D channel is not restricted by the number of packets U
receives in the message sending phase on the S −U channel.
Consider the following scenario. Assume S and U can both
generate a random packet C, which is not yet known to D.
If S sends C +W to D, while U sends C, with a different
interpretation of the packets we can equally say that U sends
C′ +W , where C′ = C +W . Hence, although U does not
knowW , it can send an encrypted packet of the form C′+W .
The above observation is counter intuitive for our usual
flow-based interpretation of network traffic. For D it is not
always possible to tell through which path a certain message
packet has arrived, because it depends on the interpretation
of the packet. This gives us some flexibility and it overrules
the common sense that it should not be possible to send more
message packets on the U−D channel than what was received
by U in the message sending phase on the S − U channel.
This reveals that in some cases the two phase interpretation
of the scheme leaves a choice on where we separate the phases.
We follow the convention that we call a key generation packet
that appears as a random packet to the receiver upon reception
and call an encrypted message packet that enables immediately
the decryption of a message packet or a linear combination of
message packets with the help of previously received packets.
IV. SCHEME
In this section we show the direct part of Theorem 1.
We need to prove that whenever the above linear program
is feasible there exists a scheme that achieves rate R.
A. Key generation phase
1) S − U channel: S sends nk2 i.i.d. uniform random
packets.
2) S−D channel: S first sends nk1 i.i.d. uniform random
packets. From the k2(1 − δ2) packets that U receives in the
key generation phase two disjoint set of nc and nr3 packets
C and R3 are selected. Further, let G be an nc× n(c1 + c3)
matrix such that G is the generator of an MDS code. Then
compute
CG =
[
C1 C3
]
,
where C1 is a matrix of nc1 packets and C3 is a matrix of
nc3 packets. S sends the nc1 packets from C1 XOR-ed with a
message packet. All the nc1 such transmissions use a different
packet from C1, but the same message packet is used again
in the next transmission to form the XOR-ed packet in case
D does not receive a transmission.
3) U −D channel: U first sends nk3 i.i.d. uniform random
packets. Then, U sends the nc3 packets from matrix C3.
Following this U sends the nr3 packets in R3 using ARQ.
B. Key rates
Using Theorem 2 we can calculate the key rates these key
generation strategies allow. We have to note that the key
generation packets received by U give rise to a common
randomness of rate k2(1 − δ2) between S and U . Packets
C1, C3 and R3 generated from this common randomness can
be used as if they were i.i.d. uniform random key generation
packets. This follows from the MDS property of G as well as
from constraints (5)-(7). This property was shown by Lemma 3
in [8].
1) S − U channel: The nk2 key generation packets allow
a key rate k2δ2E(1− δ2). Beside this, the nk1 key generation
packets sent through the S − D channel can be used for
encryption resulting an overall key rate
k2δ2E(1− δ2) + k1(1− δ1). (32)
2) S −D channel: From the S −D channel’s perspective
there is no difference between the nk1 i.i.d. random packets
and the nc1 packets formed by XOR-ing packets from C1 and
W . Indeed, these packets are i.i.d. random packets and they
are independent of the message packets that are to be sent in
the message sending phase of this channel. This property is
ensured by constraint (6). Beside these keys S can also use
packets that D receives from U . There are nr3 + nc3(1− δ3)
such packets that S can also generate. This results an overall
key rate
(k1 + c1)δ1E(1− δ1) + r3 + c3(1− δ3). (33)
3) U −D channel: From the U −D channel’s perspective
there is no difference between the nk3 private random packets
and the nc3 packets generated from the common randomness
between S and U . Beside these we take into account the nr3
packets sent using ARQ which provides access to a secret key
at rate
(k3 + c3)δ3E(1− δ3) + r3
δ3E(1− δ3)
1− δ3δ3E
(34)
C. Encryption and message sending phase
The message packets are split into parts as follows. S
considers the nc1(1− δ) message packets that are sent XOR-
ed with the packets from C1 already delivered. The rest of the
message is divided into two parts: nm1(1− δ) packets W1 to
be sent through the S −D channel and nm2(1− δ2) packets
W2 to be sent through the S − U channel.
1) S − U channel: The encryption and message sending
phase is straightforward on the S−U channel. Let K2 denote
the matrix formed of the nk1(1−δ1) received byD through the
S−D channel in the first step of the key generation (denoted
by K
(1)
2 ), together with the nk2δ2E(1 − δ2) keys generated
on the S−U channel (denoted by K
(2)
2 ). Then, the encrypted
packets W ′2 are calculated as
W ′2 =W2 ⊕K2G2 =W2 ⊕
[
K
(1)
2 K
(2)
2
] [
G
(1)
2
G
(2)
2
]
(35)
where G2 is a n(k1(1 − δ1) + k2δ2E(1 − δ2)) × nm2(1 −
δ2) matrix and is a generator of an MDS code. In notation
we distinguish the first nk1(1 − δ1) rows of G2 and the last
nk2δ2E(1−δ2) rows of it byG
(1)
2 , G
(2)
2 . The encrypted packets
are then sent using ARQ.
2) S − D channel: S forms a key K1 according to (33)
and encrypts the packets W1 as
W ′1 =W1 ⊕K1G1, (36)
where G1 is a n(k1δ1E(1−δ1)+c3(1−δ3)+r3)×nm1(1−δ1)
matrix and is a generator of an MDS code. The encrypted
packets are then sent using ARQ.
3) U −D channel: We need to define the operations that
U performs on the packets it receives. U sends three set
of packets interpreted as encrypted message packets. It first
calculates
W ′′2 =W
′
2 ⊕K
(2)
2 G
(2)
2 =W2 ⊕K
(1)
1 G
(1)
2 , (37)
The resulting packets W ′′2 are linear combinations of the
message W and the key generation packets from the S −D
channel. U computes[
W ′3a W
′
3b
]
=W ′′2 G3 =W
′′
2
[
G3a G3b
]
, (38)
where G3 is an nm2(1 − δ2) × nm2(1 − δ2) invertible
matrix such that G3a is of size nm2(1− δ2)×min{nk1(1−
δ1)
1−δ3δ3E
1−δ3E
, nm2(1− δ2)} such that G
(1)
2 G3a is the generator
of an MDS code. Encrypted packets W ′3a are then sent using
ARQ. The remaining W ′3b packets are considered as unen-
crypted message packets to be sent after further encryption.
The second set of packets U sends are the nc1(1 − δ1)
packets from C1 that were received by D XOR-ed with a
message packet. These packets are sent using ARQ. These
packets enable D to decode nc1(1 − δ1) message packets.
Also, for the eavesdropper on the U − D channel these are
random packets independent from the message, thus these
packets allow the generation of further nc1(1 − δ1)
δ3E(1−δ3)
1−δ3δ3E
key packets to be used by U . Thus besides the keys from the
key generation phase (34), U can use these additional secret
keys to from its key K3.
U uses K3 to encrypt the remaining part of the message
W ′3b, which results the third set of message packets U sends:
W ′′3b =W
′
3b ⊕K3G
′
3, (39)
where G′3 is a |K3| × (nm2(1− δ2)− nk1(1− δ1)
1−δ3δ3E
1−δ3E
)+
matrix and is a generator of an MDS code. Packets W ′′3b are
then sent using ARQ.
D. Analysis
1) Rate: Let
nm3 =
nc1(1− δ1)
1− δ3
+
nm2(1− δ2)
1− δ3
, (40)
i.e. the number of transmissions that U uses in the message
sending phase. Every received packet allows D to decode
a message packet. Besides, D receives nm1(1 − δ1) pack-
ets through the S − D channel. Clearly, a message rate
(1−δ1)m1+(1−δ3)m3 is achievable as long asm3(1−δ3) ≤
c1(1− δ1) +m2(1 − δ2), which is ensured by (8).
Constraints (9)-(11) ensure that scheme described above is
feasible, i.e. no more than n transmissions are used on each
channel.
2) Security: We need to see if a sufficient key rate is
available against all eavesdroppers whenever we send en-
crypted packets. The security of the scheme then follows from
Theorem 3.
a) S − U channel: It is clear from (3) that the key rate
(32) available on this channel is sufficient to secure a message
sending phase of length nm2.
b) S −D channel: In the same way (2) ensures that the
key rate (33) is sufficient to secure the message sending phase
of length nm1.
c) U −D channel: Packets W ′3a are of the form
W ′3a =W2G3a ⊕K
(1)
1 G
(1)
2 G3a. (41)
We see the same form of encryption as in Theorem 3, applied
on the linear combination W2G3a as message packets and
matrix G
(1)
2 G3a for combining the keys K
(1)
1 . The key rate of
K
(1)
1 is k1(1 − δ1). While the rate of W
′
3a is
k1(1− δ1)
1− δ3δ3E
1− δ3E
, (42)
hence the rate of K
(1)
1 is sufficient to secure this message rate
by Theorem 3.
The second set of packets (a subset of C1) are random pack-
ets that are independent of the message, thus no encryption is
required and they cannot reveal any information to Eve about
the message.
Consider the message packets W ′3b. The rate of W
′
3b is
(m2(1 − δ2) − k1(1 − δ1)
1−δ3δ3E
1−δ3E
)+, while |K3| has rate
(k3 + c3)δ3E(1 − δ3) + (r3 + c1(1 − δ1))
δ3E(1−δ3)
1−δ3δ3E
. Hence,
for security we need that
m2(1− δ2)− k1(1− δ1)
1− δ3δ3E
1− δ3E
≤
(k3+c3)δ3E(1−δ3)
1− δ3δ3E
1− δ3E
+(r3+c1(1−δ1))
δ3E(1− δ3)
1− δ3E
(43)
Using (40) we get:
m3(1− δ3)− c1(1 − δ1)− k1(1− δ1)
1− δ3δ3E
1− δ3E
≤
(k3+c3)δ3E(1−δ3)
1 − δ3δ3E
1− δ3E
+(r3+c1(1−δ1))
δ3E(1− δ3)
1− δ3E
(44)
After rearranging terms this condition becomes constraint (4),
hence the security of message packets W ′3b is ensured by the
feasibility of LP1.
This concludes the proof of the direct part of Theorem 1. We
have seen that the scheme is feasible, it achieves the claimed
rate and it ensures security against each eavesdropper.
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